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Abstract: Th rough a multi-sited study of the Norwegian state-owned renewable 
energy corporation Statkraft , this article explores how the increasing embedding 
of corporate social responsibility in international guidelines impacts the way re-
sponsibility is handled when large energy corporations operate overseas. Focusing 
on one of Statkraft ’s projects in Turkey, we detail how standards are used to guide 
both operations in the fi eld and external reporting, in the process distancing the 
corporation from its Norwegian origin. We argue that the application of standards 
results in much less standardization than is oft en assumed. “Stories” become as 
important for reporting as standards, and the elusive fi gure of the “stakeholder” 
plays an important role in holding together the heterogeneous fi eld of corporate 
responsibility. 
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Oslo 1979: Facing strong opposition to the 
planned Alta power plant in northern Norway 
from the local Sami minority population as well 
as environmentalists nationwide, one of the 
Statkraft  managers wrote in the agency’s internal 
journal that he had “a strong belief in personal 
contact. We ought to pursue far more active in-
formation through, for example, schools, youth 
organizations, mass media, and other channels. 
. . . It also seems evident that our organi zational 
structure is not adequately prepared for the de-
mands presented by our surroundings. If we are 
to succeed, we must to fi nd ways to cooperate 
with watercourse user groups to a larger extent 
than we have previously” (Gunnes 1979: 5). 
Istanbul 2015: Statkraft  was hiring a new 
Turkish corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
offi  cer for their large construction site Çetin in 
southeast Turkey—a project that confronted a 
variety of challenges, including political confl ict 
among impacted communities. In reviewing 
candidates, they were looking for someone fa-
miliar with international standards: “We already 
have a guy who can drink tea with the locals.” 
Why would even the most everyday interac-
tion with local realities in rural Turkey in 2015 
require knowing international standards, while 
management had not considered international 
standards when searching for new ways to do 
things in Norway back in 1979? In the short 
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timespan from the mid-1980s to around 2000, 
Statkraft  went through momentous change, 
from being a Norwegian state agency to be-
coming a transnational corporation in pursuit 
of profi t. Th is change also implied a shift  from 
rule-based governance to state “expectation” 
that CSR practice should be guided by interna-
tional standards. 
Th ese two vignettes are suggestive of two 
major trends during the last couple of decades: 
corporatization and internationalization of 
economic activity and the increasing degree to 
which the practice and language of CSR has be-
come informed by and embedded in a multitude 
of international guidelines. Th ese two trends 
are related. As governments lose control over 
capital, ameliorative soft  governance is sought 
through international voluntary frameworks. 
How do these changes aff ect the way respon-
sibility is handled by corporations? We pursue 
this question through a multi-sited study of 
Statkraft , a particularly “responsible” renewable 
energy corporation, owned by the Norwegian 
state. Being a fully state-owned company based 
in a Nordic corporate context raises the addi-
tional question of whether this makes a diff er-
ence to the way the corporation relates to CSR 
standards and reporting. To what extent does 
the Nordic model inform Statkraft ’s practice of 
CSR in Turkey (see Knudsen, Rajak, et al. this 
issue)? 
Th is study focuses on Statkraft ’s engagement 
in Turkey and the way in which they practice 
CSR. We have had longitudinal interaction 
from 2013 through 2018 (mainly but not lim-
ited to meetings) with staff  at headquarters in 
Oslo, with local CSR staff  in Turkey, as well as 
meetings with a range of persons who interact 
with Statkraft . Furthermore, we have conducted 
ethnographic fi eldwork in local communities 
in Turkey and surveyed corporate and govern-
ment documents, relevant internet sites of the 
corporation, and international performance 
and reporting standards. Taking a multi-sited 
approach to the application of standards in 
Stat kraft ’s work has enabled us to see beyond 
the tension between reality versus corporate 
presentation and to explore the multifaceted 
nature of CSR within and at the fringes of the 
corporation. 
While CSR was once considered to be volun-
tary acts of “doing good,” corporations now try 
to integrate social and environmental issues in 
risk management and decision-making systems, 
in performance standards, and in standard-
ized reporting frameworks intended to ensure 
transparency and accountability (Shabana et al. 
2017; Welker 2014). Critics—academics and ac-
tivists—claim that, rather than securing trans-
parency, the use of global standards, especially 
for reporting, tends to misrepresent or mask the 
way corporations perceive and act on local real-
ities, to the extent that the standards organize, 
bureaucratize, and de-politicize the impact the 
corporation has on the world (see, e.g., Garsten 
and Jacobsson 2011). Taking the Global Report-
ing Initiative (GRI) as her prime example, Sally 
Merry concludes: “Indicators produce readily 
understandable and convenient forms of knowl-
edge about the world that shape the way policy 
makers and the general public understand the 
world . . . and new opportunities for governance 
through self-governance” (2011: 92–93). 
Th is critical argument comes with several in-
terrelated assumptions that may be problematic. 
First, it is largely based on a Foucault-inspired 
critique of neoliberal governance techniques (see 
the commentary in the introduction to this theme 
section) that use overly broad brush strokes by 
incorporating into the narrative of a global neo-
liberalism ways of governance that have inde-
pendent trajectories and are developed for aims 
other than “marketization of everything.” It may 
also make overly strong claims about the eff ect 
of neoliberal governance, such as the induce-
ment of “self-governance.” Second, most of the 
literature on CSR, including studies of CSR as 
governance and in-depth ethnographic stud-
ies (such as Rajak 2011; Welker 2014) develop 
their arguments based on the assumption that 
corporations are privately owned shareholder 
fi rms. Th ere is a certain Anglo-American bias 
to this literature that makes it hard to consider 
other possible “economic-institutional ensem-
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bles” (Foucault 2008: 167). For instance, Nordic 
state-owned corporations do not necessarily 
conform to the Anglo-American model. Th ird, 
the argument pre-supposes that we accept that 
corporations are unitary, consistently apply in-
ternational standards throughout their organi-
zations, and that standards actually work (for a 
critique, see Welker 2014). What does the use 
of performance standards and sustainability re-
porting really “do” for the corporations? It has 
been argued that an important characteristic 
of standards is that they are “always already in-
complete and inadequate” (Star and Lampland 
2009: 14). Practitioners of CSR are oft en acutely 
aware of the tension between the complex re-
ality they engage in and the standards that are 
assumed to guide their work and reporting. 
In keeping with this we will assume that the 
meaning, content, and character of CSR work 
is also contested and negotiated within the 
corporation. 
Below we will fi rst discuss how the Norwe-
gian state manages its ownership of Statkraft , 
especially focusing on the evolving “expecta-
tions” for how the corporation should handle 
CSR. We show how Statkraft , at an overarch-
ing level, interprets these expectations in the 
context of increased international activity. 
Second, we outline Statkraft ’s use of the perfor-
mance standards of the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) and explain why the IFC-
inspired focus on Project Aff ected People 
(PAP) by many Statkraft  staff  is considered a 
better way to pursue “environmental and social 
management” than classical CSR. Th ird, we de-
tail Statkraft ’s CSR work in Turkey through sev-
eral case studies that show that the practice of 
CSR is fl exible and pragmatic and oft en mixed 
with other agendas of the corporation. In doing 
so, we also show how Statkraft ’s CSR work feeds 
into reporting and public relations. Drawing on 
the case studies, we argue that the application 
of standards results in much less standardiza-
tion than is oft en assumed, yet, the elusive fi g-
ure of the “stakeholder” plays an important role 
in holding together the heterogeneous fi eld of 
CSR.
Statkraft : Internationalization 
and state expectations to CSR
Th e corporatization of Statkraft  was strongly 
interconnected with internationalization of the 
power sector. When the ministerial agency Nor-
wegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate 
(NVE) split into several units in 1986, Statkraft  
became an independent economic entity. It was 
corporatized in 1992 and became a state enter-
prise. Th is was motivated by a desire to make 
the entity a more eff ective, modern, and compe-
tent actor in the recently (1991) liberalized elec-
tricity market in Norway as well as by shift s in 
Norwegian and European power supply systems 
(Skjold 2009: 228). In 2004, driven by the desire 
to operate more easily internationally (Meld. St. 
22 2001–2002; Nilsen and Th ue 2006: 371–373; 
Skjold 2015: 16), Statkraft  became a limited li-
ability, but unlisted, company. Th e state retains 
all shares, but the government has transferred 
judicial responsibility to the board and manag-
ers of the corporation. 
Statkraft ’s board had argued that “the state 
enterprise form is not known as a corporate 
form internationally” and that “the suggested 
reorganization allows Statkraft  to present it-
self more clearly as a purely commercial actor 
in line with its most important competitors” 
(Prop. 53 2003–2004: 26). Internationalization 
was the keyword in the new corporate strategy 
in 2006 (Nilsen and Th ue 2006: 397). Building 
on a strong tradition in hydropower in Norway, 
Statkraft  is now considered Europe’s largest re-
newable energy corporation and has operations 
in Asia and South America as well. 
Th e international expansion of Statkraft ’s op-
erations, especially outside of northern Europe, 
confronted the corporation with new chal-
lenges as regards responsible conduct and risk 
management, including violent local resistance 
(Skjold 2015: 212) or large-scale population 
resettlement (Laos). Its owner, the Norwegian 
state, provided only indirect guidance. Gov-
ernments in Norway have been very concerned 
that the state manages its ownership “profes-
sionally.” Th erefore, the Ministry of Trade, In-
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dustry, and Fisheries, which “owns” the corpo-
ration, is expected to not interfere in daily op-
erations, but rather express its “expectations,” 
which are to be interpreted and implemented 
by corporation management and reviewed by 
the board. Th e primary aim of the state’s own-
ership of Statkraft , as expressed in a white paper 
on state ownership, is that “[t]he company is to 
be run on a commercial basis and with the aim 
of delivering a competitive return” (Meld. St. 27 
2013–2014: 108). 
However, governments have since 2006 also 
expected that corporations under state owner-
ship should take a leading role in safeguarding 
CSR (Meld. St. 13 2006–2007: 64), noting that if 
they do not “the state’s legitimacy could be weak-
ened, for example as legislator and in matters 
concerning foreign policy” (Meld. St. 10 2008–
2009: 18). Th e 2013–2014 white paper on state 
ownership is more specifi c in that it requires cor-
porations that have overseas operations and in 
which the state has signifi cant ownership to sign 
up to Global Compact, follow the OECD respon-
sible business conduct recommendations for 
multinational corporations, take up ILO’s core 
conventions in their business, and apply GRI re-
porting standards (Meld. St. 27 2013–2014: 83). 
Th e government’s specifi c expectations that Stat-
kraft  will conduct “responsible” business abroad 
is articulated in the public arena (see fi gure 1).
Taking a leading role—
with multiple models
Th e state’s “expectations” about responsibility 
are communicated to Statkraft ’s board and man-
agement, but are quite general, so open to a cer-
tain degree of interpretation and negotiation. In 
conjunction with the publication of the white 
paper on CSR (Meld. St. 10 2008–2009), a Stat-
kraft  employee recalls discussions with fellow 
Figure 1. “Statkraft  takes responsibility in Turkey.” Th is slide is from a presentation by Mon-
ica Mæland, (Conservative Party) Minister of Trade and Industry, held at the Bergen Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry, 15 November 2013. Th e title reads “Social Responsibility—a competitive 
advantage” and states: “Clear expectations that Norwegian business abroad takes responsibility”; “In-
creased awareness among Norwegian fi rms”; “Statkraft  takes responsibility in Turkey.” (Photo from 
signing of energy agreement between Norwegian and Turkish ministers, 2013 Norwegian State visit 
to Turkey—Turkish president and Norwegian king in the background).
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employees about how to present CSR to the cor-
porate leadership and how to implement the 
white paper’s requirement of taking “a leading 
role within the fi eld.” Similar concerns were ex-
pressed when we had our very fi rst meeting with 
a senior CSR manager in Statkraft  in 2013; he 
stressed that “since Statkraft  is owned by the state 
we are also partly Norway’s ambassador. We are 
concerned about earning money in a decent way.”
Th e explicit focus on CSR emerged in Stat-
kraft  around 2003, and then specifi cally within 
SN-Power, which Statkraft  established together 
with Norfund (Norway’s Development Finance 
Institution) to invest in high-risk hydropower 
projects in developing countries (Skjold 2015: 
203–204). It was, and is, a widespread idea that 
while CSR was unnecessary in Norway since 
all relevant social and environmental matters 
were covered by law and regulations, operations 
abroad, especially beyond Europe, required 
more attention to issues such as local resistance, 
corruption, indigenous populations, and human 
rights. Th ere was large overlap in personnel and 
operations between SN Power and Statkraft , and 
both recruited many non-Norwegians into the 
organization. Half of the approximately 15 inter-
locutors we have had in Statkraft  in Oslo were 
not Norwegian, and many of the Norwegians 
have gained extensive international experience. 
Th rough international experience and staff , 
Statkraft  came to engage various internationally 
circulating models of CSR. While CSR seems at 
fi rst to have been the preferred label, Corporate 
Responsibility (CR) has since 2010 been used by 
management and in annual reports as a strate-
gic term to broaden the corporation’s work on 
responsibility, taking the attention away from 
the “social” part of CSR to include environmen-
tal and economic responsibility toward owners 
(while the Norwegian term samfunnsansvar—
societal responsibility—has been the overarch-
ing term all along) (Statkraft  2014). All new 
Stat kraft  employees receive a week’s training in 
Statkraft ’s “code of conduct” together with other 
core principles. Environmental and Social Man-
agement (ESM) has become an increasingly im-
portant corporate term; the internationally more 
widespread appellation Environmental and So-
cial Governance is also used. From 2004–2010, 
non-fi nancial parts in annual reports were called 
“sustainability” reports, and the title CSR is still 
in use, both in documents and the vernacular.1 
Th e several ways of talking about, imple-
menting, and reporting so-called non-fi nancial 
matters within Statkraft  became apparent to us 
in pursuing a multi-sited fi eldwork across dif-
ferent locations, documents, and websites. It is 
a complex picture with standards and models 
coming from diff erent places being used for dif-
ferent purposes. Th ose most frequently used in 
Turkey were the performance standards of the 
IFC and the reporting standards of the GRI—
two of the most widely used standards in the 
private sector (Idowu et al. 2016; Shabana et al. 
2017). In the following, we outline Statkraft ’s use 
of IFC performance standards (IFC-PS) and ex-
plain why this was preferred over classical CSR. 
Doing CSR with 
IFC Performance Standards
When we fi rst visited the project site in Turkey in 
2013, the CSR coordinator in Turkey gave a pre-
sentation about their work, including this slide: 
Figure 2. Localizing IFC standards in Turkey.
We came to learn that the language and ap-
proach presented in the slide was taken directly 
from the IFC-PS. IFC, one of fi ve organiza-
tions within the World Bank Group, works to 
stimulate development in developing countries 
through credits, especially for private sector 
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investments in large-scale infrastructural proj-
ects. Institutions receiving credit from the IFC 
are required to comply with IFC-PS and to re-
port to and be audited by the IFC. “Th e Perfor-
mance Standards . . . are designed to help avoid, 
mitigate, and manage risks and impacts as a way 
of doing business in a sustainable way, including 
stakeholder engagement” (IFC 2012: i). 
Statkraft ’s use of IFC-PS is voluntary. From 
at least 2009, the development of international 
projects in Statkraft ’s portfolio has been in-
formed by IFC-PS and is included in the policy 
document Th e Statkraft  Way (Statkraft  2013). 
Statkraft  employs IFC-PS even though they are 
neither bound by loans to the IFC nor required 
to by their owner. Th is praxis seems related to the 
fact that hydropower, more so than extraction of 
hydrocarbons, has been made subject to interna-
tional standards. Scandals and resistance related 
to construction of large dams resulted in the es-
tablishment of the World Commission on Dams 
in 1998 as well as the World Bank’s establish-
ment of standards for projects using IFC credit. 
Statkraft ’s fi rst activity beyond Europe had 
the character of development projects, espe-
cially its operations through SN Power with 
funding from Norfund. Statkraft ’s project in 
Nepal in the 1990s and SN Power projects in the 
2000s (Skjold 2015: 212) received IFC funding, 
and they were thus obliged to follow IFC-PS 
and reporting guidelines. Although Statkraft  no 
longer frames their projects abroad as being also 
development projects—considering them now 
to be business opportunities only—they con-
tinue to adhere to international IFC standards. 
Th e standards have been “lift ed” from the devel-
opment discourse into Norwegian state-speak 
about corporate responsibility. Government 
policy documents concerning CSR expect cor-
porations to adhere to international standards. 
However, Statkraft  considered UN Global Com-
pact and OECD guidelines to be too vague to 
guide on-the-ground implementation of CSR, 
and preferred to follow the international trend 
by adopting IFC-PS, the most widely recognized 
and used performance framework (Statkraft 
2011). Statkraft  management also thought that it 
was preferable to have consistent high-standard 
policies throughout the organization instead of 
following diff erent local standards. Choosing to 
use IFC-PS, they replaced traditional CSR with 
a holistic and long-term perspective and plan 
for corporate responsibility, while also brand-
ing Statkraft  as being a serious and responsible 
player in the international energy landscape. Yet, 
it also meant something in practice: Th rough ex-
perience, Statkraft  found IFC-PS to be a useful 
tool when they encountered new challenges, 
such as relating to indigenous populations in a 
project in Chile (Fribert 2018).
As a voluntary user, Statkraft  is in a position 
to negotiate how to employ IFC-PS. Although 
not following full IFC protocol, Statkraft  staff  
are trained in IFC-PS methodology and use 
its language for internal communication. Th is 
is, however, embedded within a broader pol-
icy for Environmental and Social Management 
(ESM) in Statkraft . Furthermore, stakeholder 
management is seen to be of critical impor-
tance for ESM and, as will be discussed further 
below, has a wider framing than that provided 
by IFC-PS. Statkraft ’s experience with a large 
resettlement program in their Th eun-Hinboun 
project in Laos, where “participatory planning” 
had helped secure “stakeholder acceptance” 
(Sparkes 2014: 65), has been formative in their 
approach to “stakeholder management.” 
Th e shift  to IFC-PS in Statkraft  was a con-
scious choice and refl ects a position in Statkraft  
about what responsibility really implies. Most 
of the ESM people in Statkraft  dislike the con-
cept CSR, which they describe as signifying 
“corporate excuse, twisted branding,” and as 
philanthropy verging on corruption. Although 
realizing that CSR can be a useful term to build 
a reputation, they would typically assert that 
public relations and the socio-economic should 
ideally be “unmixed.” “In the fi eld CSR proves 
to be utterly useless,” they contended. In place 
of CSR they stressed the value of IFC-PS and 
its emphasis on project-aff ected people, mitiga-
tion, and livelihood restoration. 
Th is is congruent with a broader shift  in 
corporate circles (Edgecliff e-Johnson 2019) to-
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ward Environmental and Social Governance 
and is mirrored by one of the leaders of the IFC, 
who in conversation with us stressed that the 
social and environmental policies of corpora-
tions should be “rights-based” and not charity 
(which he thought characterized CSR). Th is 
take on CSR stresses, rather, that it should be 
integrated in the way corporations do business; 
those working with ESM in Statkraft  have ar-
gued internally for having CSR included in the 
risk-management process, motivated in part by 
a need to legitimize spending money on CSR. 
Th e following section explores what ensues 
when the IFC standards meet local realities in a 
concrete project. 
“Statkraft  takes responsibility in Turkey”
Statkraft  bought a portfolio of three projects in 
Turkey in 2009, entering a power and electricity 
market that had been going through a radical 
liberalization and deregulation process since 
the early 2000s (see e.g., Harris and Işlar 2014). 
In the face of Turkey’s heavy dependence on im-
ported oil and gas, a primary strategy of Erdo-
gan’s governments has been to stimulate growth 
through the development of hydropower and 
other domestic energy resources. While the 
Turkish state remains the main driver for con-
struction of hydropower, lack of domestic cap-
ital and competence has led to the invitation 
of foreign corporate investment in the energy 
sector. Statkraft  is only one of many European 
corporations that started exploring this oppor-
tunity during the 2000s. 
Statkraft ’s construction on the run-of-the-
river medium-sized power plant Kargı (located 
between Ankara and the Black Sea coast) started 
in 2011, and the power plant was put into opera-
tion in May 2015. Th e smaller power plant Çakıt 
in Adana Province did not require construction 
work and began commercial operation in June 
2010, while the construction of the third proj-
ect in Çetin located in the southeastern part 
of the Anatolian region began in 2012 and was 
expected to be Statkraft ’s largest hydro asset 
outside of Norway. Statkraft  reckoned that they 
had invested in a safe market within a growing 
economy and expected that they would expand 
further in Turkey. 
Terror incidents, falling prices for electric-
ity, the Syrian refugee crisis, and political un-
certainty made Statkraft  put on the brakes, and 
when the project in Çetin became implicated 
in complex state-political-development pro-
cesses and accumulated a composite of prob-
lems (technical, security, contractual, political) 
they halted construction and eventually sold 
the project in 2017 to a Turkish corporation, 
which has worked as Statkraft ’s contractor in 
their project in Albania. Although starting with 
10–20 employees, the local Statkraft  staff  work-
ing on CSR has, with the sell-off  of Çetin and 
the shift  to operation in Kargı, been reduced 
to only one person. We arrived when Statkraft  
was becoming uncertain about their strategy in 
Turkey, and, because we could not gain access to 
the fi eld in Çetin, focused instead on Statkraft ’s 
Kargı project.
Overall, IFC-PS has been the main frame-
work for Statkraft ’s CSR work in Turkey. At 
an overarching, national level, they have also 
supported World Wildlife Fund and Syrian 
refugees; at the local level, they have organized 
training and public awareness concerning traf-
fi c and reservoir security and provided com-
munity support. Th e project in Çetin involved 
other initiatives as well. Adhering to the IFC 
requirement that “(w)hen host country reg-
ulations diff er from” IFC-PS, “projects are ex-
pected to achieve whichever is more stringent” 
(IFC 2012), Statkraft  prepared social impact 
assessments (SIA) for their projects in Turkey 
(not required by Turkish regulation) (IFC 2015: 
57). Th e Çetin SIA, prepared by international 
experts, was thoroughly informed by IFC-PS, 
elaborating, over a couple of pages, the details 
of stakeholder engagement and assessment us-
ing IFC-PS (Meadows et al. 2010: 21–23). Th e 
emphasis on IFC-PS is also seen in documents 
prepared for the Kargı project. Th e “Environ-
mental and Social Management Plan for Oper-
ation (2016–2020)” was “produced in line with 
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Th e Statkraft  Way” and the IFC-PS. Accordingly, 
the CSR work focuses, as we saw in Figure 2, on 
project-aff ected people (PAP), impact mitiga-
tion, livelihood restoration, and compensation. 
Yet, the concept CSR is also used in the report, 
and the CSR-budget/reporting format includes 
several non-IFC topics, including “public rela-
tions.” So, how is IFC-PS set to work in Kargı?
Th e main agricultural activity in the im-
pacted districts Osmancık and Kargı is the culti-
vation of rice on irrigated banks along the river 
Kızılırmak. Th e Kargı hydropower project in-
cludes a relatively small reservoir in the district 
of Osmancık, from where a tunnel, short-cut-
ting Kargı, transfers water from an outlet near 
the dam to a point further downstream where 
the powerhouse is located. Th e areas inundated 
by the dam are not very extensive,2 and had 
mostly been used for intensive high-value rice 
cultivation. Downstream, and mainly in the 
district of Kargı, the major impact is related to 
reduced fl ow. 
During construction, the primary concern 
for Statkraft ’s CSR work was to compensate, ac-
cording to Turkish law, for the loss of rice-farm-
ing land. However, compensation alone—based 
on state expropriation of land, a demanding and 
extensive process—was not suffi  cient to com-
ply with the IFC-PS or Th e Statkraft  Way guide 
for Environmental Management, which states: 
“Statkraft  shall ensure that grievances from 
aff ected communities and external communi-
cations from other stakeholders are responded 
to and managed appropriately.” Th erefore, Stat-
kraft  established a grievance mechanism, oper-
ated out of a liaison offi  ce in Osmancık, whereby 
they assisted the farmers with the expropriation 
process. Statkraft  also worked to help farmers 
fi nd new sources of income through livelihood 
restoration projects. Farmers were provided 
equipment and training in horticulture, green-
house farming, honey production, and other 
agricultural activities that require less water. 
Aft er hydropower production started, the fo-
cus of CSR shift ed to include the downstream 
issue, which was framed by a legal requirement 
to provide enough water for rice farmers. 
When we met with Metin, one of Statkraft ’s 
CSR offi  cers, in 2016, we were invited to join a 
meeting intended to stimulate livelihood res-
toration through beekeeping. Approximately 
25 middle-aged and elderly farmers who had 
lost their rice farms to the dam attended. Th e 
beekeeping consultant engaged by Statkraft  for 
the project talked about knowledge sharing and 
cooperation and explained that beekeeping “is 
quite diffi  cult, but possible if you are willing to 
learn”: “at fi rst we will hold your hand, guide you 
through it; then we let go of your hand, help you 
when you need it; until, aft er a two-year period, 
our help is unnecessary.” Th e farmers seemed to 
be interested, and were keen to ask questions. 
Th e project was obviously considered prom-
ising, and Metin posted a “snapshot” (a photo 
with a short text posted on the internal web for 
those in Statkraft  working in/with Turkey). 
However, beekeeping was not a success. Af-
ter only a year the project was discontinued. A 
few farmers continued the greenhouse project, 
but, otherwise, farmers, or PAPs according to 
IFC and Statkraft  lingo, were not very keen on 
taking up the “livelihood restoration” oppor-
tunities presented to them by Statkraft . Th ey 
preferred cash payments, which they could in-
vest in property and/or their children’s educa-
tion. Th eir attitude was related to the general 
economic and demographic structure. Th e ag-
ricultural sector in Turkey is increasingly mar-
ginalized, and the rural population is decreasing 
and aging. Most farmers in Osmancık and Kargı 
are over 50 years old, and, generally, their chil-
dren have moved to larger cities in the west, 
particularly Istanbul. Although the beekeeping 
project was unsuccessful, Statkraft  showed the 
ability to pragmatically extend CSR in various 
directions. 
Pragmatic extension of CSR
A local initiative: Recycling 
When we returned to Osmancık in 2017, Me-
tin was more keen to talk about a new initiative 
than the failed beekeeping project. He wanted 
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to show us the year’s most successful environ-
mental and social project: recycling projects at 
local schools. Statkraft  had, on Metin’s sugges-
tion, initiated the projects in response to the 
problem with waste at the dam. In cooperation 
with local authorities, Statkraft  trained two 
schools how to recycle. Pupils learned to gather 
plastic, paper, and metal and toss it all into a bin 
in the schoolyard. A recycling company gath-
ered the waste once a week, sorted and weighed 
it, and reported back to Statkraft . For each ton 
collected, the school got a used Statkraft  laptop 
computer. 
We went with Metin to the schools to deliver 
laptops. Th e primary school had managed to 
collect eight tons of waste, while the second-
ary school had collected two tons. Both schools 
wanted to continue the project aft er it was 
scheduled to be discontinued one month later, 
but Metin informed them that “there are unfor-
tunately no more laptops to deliver.” Th e prin-
cipal argued that they did not care about the 
laptops only the project, because it had positive 
ripple eff ects in the local community, creating 
awareness about recycling and climate. Aft er tea 
and small talk with the principal about the value 
of the recycling project for the children and the 
local community, Metin called the main offi  ce 
in Oslo, which confi rmed that the schools could 
keep the bins. When we left  the schools, Metin 
was happy: “Th is is a very successful project. 
Th e schools are taking responsibility—making 
the project their own.” 
Th e recycling project is more in line with the 
typical way for Turkish corporations to con-
tribute to society. Some locals voiced opinions, 
such as: A “large foreign company like Statkraft ” 
should invest more in “social projects” or “so-
cial funds” (Osmancık Haber 2013); and “I have 
not seen any social support from Statkraft ” 
(conversation with local farmer). Th e concept 
“social support/projects/funds” here indicates 
a diff erent approach to corporate responsibility 
than that practiced by Statkraft . Philanthropy 
remains the dominant form of CSR in Turkey 
and “most business groups in Turkey have an 
associated foundation” (Ararat 2008: 277) typ-
ically supporting “society,” especially education, 
religion, and health. In Turkey, moral standards 
for the appropriate or expected behavior of 
Figure 3. Good Neighbors. From the article “Recycling Knowledge,” Statkraft ’s magazine People and 
Power 2 (2017): 37.
Standardizing responsibility through the stakeholder fi gure | 67
business owners and leaders are strongly con-
nected to ideals and practices of patron-client 
relations.3 
A good example of how this Turkish frame-
work for charitable giving informs the way large 
Turkish energy fi rms perform their responsibil-
ity to society can be found in the CSR prize of an 
annual Istanbul energy conference. In 2018, the 
prize was awarded to an energy utilities com-
pany that had successfully provided clothing 
and food for pupils at village schools and sup-
ported sports and Ramadan meals (Beyaz gazete 
2018). In the Turkish context, this is not usually 
“rights based,” but considered a human duty, a 
moral obligation embedded in interpersonal re-
lations. While Statkraft  tries to embed ethics in 
systems and international standards, in Turkey, 
people tend to prefer to see ethics as embedded 
in persons and interpersonal relations. To the 
extent that “impact management” is considered 
anyone’s responsibility, it would be in the gov-
ernment’s implementation of state regulations. 
It is also notable that the Nordic model for a 
corporation’s interaction with its environs is not 
activated. For instance, relating to or involving 
unions was totally outside of the scope of Stat-
kraft ’s approach in Turkey.
In addition to the livelihood restoration proj-
ects, Statkraft  also undertook what is regarded 
as classical CSR work, or locally as “social proj-
ects.” Although the CSR personnel were am-
bivalent about it, they established community 
development funds (included in their CSR bud-
get), which were used for a variety of purposes, 
such as funding for Ramadan meals. Th ey re-
alized that some such activity was needed to 
build and sustain good relations. Supporting 
schools—as Statkraft  did in the recycling proj-
ect—is also the kind of thing corporations are 
expected to do in Turkey. Unlike the livelihood 
projects, this initiative received a decent de-
gree of local press coverage. Th us, the Turkish 
understanding of corporate responsibilities in-
creasingly came to inform the CSR work of Stat-
kraft . CSR became “localized” (Welker 2014) or 
“domesticated” (Knudsen 2015) as the recycling 
project emerged as a local success. 
Th e cases discussed above relate primarily to 
the area directly impacted by the dam where it 
inundated rice fi elds near Osmancık. Another 
way in which Statkraft  has pragmatically ex-
tended and adapted CSR work to fi t new situa-
tions and agendas emerges as we turn attention 
to the downstream issue.
Rice cultivation in Kargı
Early autumn is a busy period for rice cultiva-
tors in Kargı. Most open spaces are covered by 
rice spread out for drying. In 2016, we dropped 
in to visit our acquaintance İsmail at his camp 
and threshing ground. Learning that he was 
away on an errand, we were treated to a sim-
ple meal, including rice—from their own pro-
duction—which they eat every day, year round. 
İsmail’s wife, an elderly woman, complained 
about her bad back and pain in her legs. Still, 
she was compelled to work; they needed money 
to marry off  their grandchild. 
İsmail arrived on his motorbike. He was tired 
and morose. Long days and hard work for an old 
man. His 50-year-old son was more talkative. 
Th e son operates the harvester they bought 
a few years ago and is paid three hak (“rihts,” 
one hak equaling two bins each 6 kg of rice) for 
each acre (dönüm) that he harvests for others. 
Like many other families, their extended family 
works together to cultivate both their own fi elds 
as well as the sharecropped (yarıcılık) fi elds of 
more wealthy farmers. As is common in Kargı, 
their plots are small and widely dispersed, mak-
ing the operation of the harvester cumbersome 
and costly. Th e rice cultivators desire a reorga-
nization and consolidation (toplulaştırma) of 
their fi elds, but that is diffi  cult to achieve with-
out political will. 
For many, rice cultivation has developed into 
a side income. Most rice cultivators are middle-
aged or older. Young people are leaving Kargı, 
and the population of the small town risks 
falling below 5,000, which is the threshold for 
being a municipality in Turkey. Although con-
cerned about the dam constructed by Statkraft , 
rice cultivators fi nd that they have enough 
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water. Many farmers related that, when water 
stopped fl owing a few years back, they called 
Statkraft  and the water fl ow resumed. Th ey are 
more concerned about the costs of pumping 
water from the Kızılırmak up into the canals 
and their fi elds. Th ere are also other costs in-
volved: seeds, fertilizer and pesticides, guards, 
and more. Many complain that “the state does 
not support us any longer. We are not given a 
guaranteed price for the rice.” 
Interacting with a broad cross section of the 
society of Kargı, we tried to elicit the history 
and structure of the irrigation system in the dis-
trict. Nobody seemed to really know. Th ere are 
many institutions involved: state water works 
(DSİ); the Kargı municipality; village heads; 
rice-farming cooperatives; the district offi  ce of 
the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Live-
stock; the Agricultural Credit Cooperative; the 
Kargı Chamber of Agriculture, among others. 
Ownership of and responsibility for maintain-
ing the irrigation structure is unclear. Do the 
state water works or the cooperatives own the 
channels? Th ere is no overview of where wa-
ter comes from and where it goes. Th ere is no 
overall plan for irrigation and cultivation except 
for some limited measures administered by the 
state-organized District Rice Commission.
Surveying irrigation, enlisting stakeholders
Statkraft  is under contract with the state wa-
ter works to release enough water for the 700 
downstream farmers, mostly smallholders, to 
continue irrigation of their rice paddies during 
the May to October cultivation season. Th e 
contract stipulates the amount of water to be 
released as well as the periodicity. To help en-
sure that farmers received enough water for 
irrigation, Statkraft  organized and funded re-
furbishment of water-intake weirs. Beyond this, 
the CSR consultant’s regular monitoring of wa-
ter fl ow and agricultural activities convinced 
corporate leadership that it could be useful to 
make a detailed survey of the irrigation system 
and water use in Kargı. An international con-
sultancy was contracted. Th e work basically in-
volved walking up all channels, weirs, and the 
like, and mapping them into a Google Earth 
template program to produce a detailed digital 
map of the irrigation system. 
According to Statkraft  personnel, “stakeholder 
mapping” was undertaken, and stakeholders 
were consulted in the process. Th e instrumental 
and managerial approach to “stakeholders” is 
demonstrated in this excerpt from an internal 
Statkraft  presentation: “Engaging with stake-
holders from the start (before operation) en-
ables a proactive cultivation of relationships that 
can serve as ‘capital’ during challenging times.” 
During our fi eldwork in Kargı it emerged that 
almost no one (except two leading local offi  cers) 
knew about the irrigation survey and even fa-
miliarity with Statkraft  was limited. İsmail was 
relatively well-informed about Statkraft , but 
he and his fellow villagers knew nothing of the 
survey when we met him in late 2018, aft er the 
survey had been completed, which was striking 
given that he is a village head and village heads 
are identifi ed by Statkraft  as being among their 
primary stakeholders. A few meetings had been 
organized before the survey took place, but they 
did not focus on the survey. Only aft er a draft  
of the digital map had been produced did the 
CSR offi  cer and an expert from the consultancy 
fi rm perform what they called “ground truth-
ing,” that is, checking their fi ndings with local 
farmers, thus clearly serving Statkraft ’s rather 
than stakeholders’ interests. 
Statkraft ’s primary objective in doing the 
survey was, we were told, to “know the system 
better.” Th e detailed knowledge gained about 
the irrigation system enabled them to start re-
negotiating the contract with the state water 
works with a view to becoming obliged to re-
lease less water during the irrigation season, in 
eff ect meaning that more water is retained for 
Statkraft  to produce electricity and income. Al-
though the project was not funded through the 
CSR budget, but from “assets,” it was managed 
by CSR personnel. It is a “win-win situation,” a 
CSR offi  cer told us. He thought it was natural 
that they, who were involved with stakehold-
ers and community relations, handled this: “It 
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is oft entimes the case that we have overlapping 
interests with other sections in the corporation.” 
Th at Statkraft  considers the survey of the irriga-
tion system to be CSR activity demonstrates the 
fl exible pragmatism of the corporation when it 
comes to implementing standards, and also the 
perceived importance of community and stake-
holder relations for making things work locally 
(see Welker 2014).
Reporting CSR
Like performance, reporting CSR also involves a 
pragmatic approach. Although external report-
ing is not met with any signifi cant sanctions, 
Statkraft  is obliged to conform to the language 
of GRI for reporting purposes. Managed pri-
marily by a small section at headquarters, the 
GRI standards do not travel very far or deep into 
the Statkraft  organization, and are distinctly dif-
ferent from the IFC-PS language. Working for 
external reporting in Statkraft , therefore, in-
volves considerable internal translation work to 
produce not only indicators, but also stories in 
which “stakeholders” fi gure prominently. 
Stories are, however, not only reputation-
management material. Th ey may also become 
important ingredients in Statkraft ’s reporting 
processes. Reporting in keeping with the law on 
accounting requires, according to the Offi  ce of 
the Auditor General of Norway, an annual re-
port, a sustainability/CSR report, and quarterly 
results, but can include information from the 
corporation’s web pages (OAGN 2016–2017: 
151). According to personnel in the Statkraft  
CR division, stories in their magazines are con-
sidered to be “realistic” fi eld reports, and are 
used as the backdrop for annual reports and 
further CR strategy development. 
Th e consideration of fi eld reports as “realis-
tic” depictions of CSR in practice makes internal 
reporting key to CSR offi  cers. When Statkraft  
decided to keep only one of the two local CSR 
offi  cers, they retained the one who was best at 
reporting. One of his superiors stressed that 
“quality in reporting is essential.” Reporting, he 
maintained, is a skill that takes time to acquire, 
and Statkraft  observes a strict reporting cycle. 
For instance, the plan for Environmental and 
Social Management in the Kargı project (2016–
2020) prescribed quarterly reporting on content 
and spending for a range of matters. Once a year 
the CSR offi  cer is also asked to submit a stan-
dardized risk assessment form. Th is reporting is 
not guided by GRI standards, but works within 
an ESM framework.
 Although internal reporting follows certain 
templates/formats, there is room for individ-
ual initiatives, such as the recycling project. As 
Metin left  the meeting with the principal with 
whom he had discussed the future of the recy-
cling project, he remarked, “I must report to Ly-
saker [Statkraft ’s headquarters in Norway].” His 
next step was to gather photos and documents 
from the schools and prepare a presentation for 
the next CSR performance meeting in Lysaker. 
Th e recycling project, like the beekeeping proj-
ect, was circulated internally as a “snapshot,” 
but subsequently picked up for publication in 
the online Statkraft  Stories Collection and the 
Statkraft  magazine People and Power (Statkraft  
2017c).
Th e Kargı irrigation survey also traveled up 
through the organization to be included in Stat-
kraft ’s Annual Report 2017 where a photo that 
had started out as an internal “snapshot” about 
ground truthing was displayed among “High-
lights” with the caption: “Continuous dialogue 
with stakeholders was upheld, like in Turkey 
where downstream impacts were discussed 
with local farmers” (Statkraft  2017a: 3). Th e 
Kargı irrigation survey is presented as “a mit-
igation programme to improve irrigation sys-
tems downstream of the intake dam” (Statkraft  
2017a: 30). Th e major motivation for the sur-
vey—the potential for making more profi t—was 
underplayed, while the alignment with IFC-PS 
framework (“mitigation”) and degree of interac-
tion with stakeholders was exaggerated. 
While “stories” travel up through the Stat-
kraft  organization and fi gure in external re-
porting, the formal framework for Statkraft ’s 
external reporting is GRI in accordance with 
70 | Ståle Knudsen, Ingrid Birce Müft üoğlu, Isabelle Hugøy
the expectations of the Norwegian state (Meld. 
St. 27 2013–2014: 83). GRI was established in 
1997 as an independent international organiza-
tion and has become the dominant framework 
for sustainability reporting. In order to simplify 
and ensure relevance of reporting, GRI estab-
lished the “materiality” (i.e., essential) principle, 
which implies that organizations are expected 
to address and report on matters that are cen-
tral to its impact on society and environment. 
Th e latest version of GRI standards, G4, “guides 
companies in how to identify their major sus-
tainability impacts, and then enter into a dia-
logue with key stakeholders—which they defi ne 
themselves—to answer the question: ‘What are 
the material aspects, and to whom?’” (GRI & 
Robecosam 2016: 8). Th us, it is left  to each indi-
vidual organization/company to design how it 
will organize stakeholder processes and identify 
material aspects. Process, not indicators, are im-
posed by GRI on Statkraft . 
Statkraft  started following the GRI recom-
mendations several years before the state made 
it a requirement. In 2015, they undertook the 
materiality analysis, primarily by arranging 
workshops with key persons within Statkraft 
and with only limited input from stakeholders. 
Involved staff  were asked by colleagues from the 
CR unit to assess diff erent “aspects . . . based on 
how important it is for Statkraft ’s ability to meet 
corporate strategies and goals, and retain our 
‘license to operate.’” Aft er categories and con-
tent were negotiated internally, the materiality 
assessment identifi ed six aspects that were most 
“material,” related to environmental issues, 
safety, human rights, and anti-corruption (Stat-
kraft  2015). Th e materiality analysis is meant to 
give structure to further CSR work: “Statkraft  
has developed ambitions and goals towards 
2020 for the six material topics, and Statkraft ’s 
corporate responsibility report is structured ac-
cording to the identifi ed material topics” (Stat-
kraft  2017b: 32).
Reporting to GRI does not really involve 
any content and review thereof by GRI—it es-
sentially means submitting a GRI-structured 
report for publication on GRI’s website. Th e 
2017 CR report includes four pages that essen-
tially only list what has been reported by and to 
whom (e.g., the Statkraft  board), organized by 
the categories and standards used by GRI.4 Th e 
reporting recommendations by the state are not 
supported by any sanctions, and leave Statkraft  
to decide how to involve stakeholders in mate-
riality assessment and reporting. In their daily 
internal work those responsible for reporting in 
Statkraft  do not consult stakeholders directly, 
but rather organize in-house studies of stake-
holder perspectives and interact with Statkraft  
staff  who can provide useful “stories” or other 
relevant information for their reports. Th ey 
consider this robust enough since stakeholder 
engagement is integral to all phases of Statkraft ’s 
projects. Th us, Statkraft  is very much at liberty 
to design the process and content of reports. 
Given the limited content and sanction relating 
to the use of the GRI standards, “stakeholder” 
perspective and “stakeholder” involvement 
stands out as a central legitimizing fi gure for 
Statkraft ’s approach to CSR. 
Managing stakeholders
What emerges from the discussion of the appli-
cation of diff erent standards above is the ubiq-
uity of the fi gure of “stakeholder.” It is one of 
the few concepts that has purchase across the 
diff erent standards and models that Statkraft 
employs or relates to when enacting responsi-
bility. However, that does not necessarily imply 
that its meaning is the same within diff erent 
contexts. “Stakeholder” is a particularly open 
and negotiable concept with no clear denota-
tional value—it is detached from larger struc-
tures of power, politics, and economy, which 
Giles Mohan and Kristian Stokke (2000) call 
“the dangers of localism.” “[T]he weakness of 
stakeholder theory lies in the underspecifi ca-
tion of the organization/stakeholder relation 
in itself ” (Friedman and Miles 2002: 15). It is 
precisely this underspecifi cation that makes the 
frequent deployment of the term “stakeholder” 
across a variety of contexts and for diff erent 
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purposes possible and useful for Statkraft  and 
gives a semblance of their CSR work being co-
hesive and unitary. But, there is a huge diff er-
ence between a property-less peasant in Kargı 
(e.g., not being entitled to membership in a co-
operative) and the state water works (“our most 
important stakeholder”). Beyond this, the un-
derspecifi cation of the stakeholder concept also 
facilitates the enactment of multiple versions of 
the same stakeholder at diff erent places in the 
corporation: the irrigation project stakeholders 
engaged by the CSR offi  cer in Kargı are very dif-
ferent from the irrigation project stakeholders 
who fi gure into the 2017 Annual report. 
Although it is commonplace today to use the 
term stakeholder in a wide range of contexts, 
including environmental management and de-
velopment projects, the concept had its roots in 
business and management science in the early 
1980s (Grimble and Wellard 1997; Jones and 
Wicks 1999). But the management literature 
and its adoption by businesses has largely been 
insensitive to framing issues. Who defi nes the 
issue? What defi nition of stakeholder is to be 
employed? Which actors are aff ected by or have 
an interest in the topic? What is the “mandate” 
for stakeholder involvement? Every decision 
about who is entitled to be considered a stake-
holder is, in the end, political. Company control 
of reporting processes means that the corpo-
rate perspective will dominate and stakeholder 
dialogue can be transformed into the ultimate 
legitimating tool, since stakeholders carry legit-
imating authority in “participatory” processes 
(Cooke and Kothari 2001). Questioning the 
content of a report becomes more diffi  cult if an 
organization can say that it has consulted stake-
holders when preparing the report. 
Th e contrast between the minimal involve-
ment of “stakeholders” and lack of local con-
sultation, on the one hand, and the profi ling 
of “stakeholders” in external communication 
by the corporation, on the other hand, shows 
that, sometimes, the real concern about “stake-
holders” is at the corporate level—in reports 
and reputational management. Th e local stake-
holder is an important legitimizing fi gure in CR 
reporting and in corporate communication. Th e 
CSR consultants have an important position in 
this, doing in eff ect not only work directed at 
the community, but also upwards within the 
corporation.
While Statkraft ’s use of “stakeholder” may 
seem to be political, it does not have the “deep” 
eff ect “neoliberalism as governance” approaches 
sometimes assume. Few readers of Statkraft ’s CR 
report actually understand the indicators used, 
and hardly any of Statkraft ’s “stakeholders” real-
ize that they are “stakeholders” and sometimes 
even “PAPs.” Th ey are not covertly guided to-
ward self-governance (see Merry 2011) through 
internalizing Statkraft ’s use of standards and in-
dicators. Statkraft  does not organize the world 
of stakeholders through indicators—the indi-
cators hardly organize things internal to Stat-
kraft . Th at the indicators are produced is more 
important than what they actually reveal, since 
their existence is suffi  cient to fulfi ll reporting 
requirements. Th erefore, the stories told in the 
report or in the Statkraft  magazine are just as 
important as the indicators for conveying Stat-
kraft ’s responsible approach.
Conclusion
CSR is many things in Statkraft . A multi-sited 
approach has enabled us to see that responsibil-
ity is engaged by diff erent people with diff erent 
agendas in a range of diff erent places across the 
complex, geographically distributed corpora-
tion. CSR is transformed and transmuted and 
set to do diff erent kinds of work. It is sometimes 
compartmentalized—in organizational struc-
ture, reports, and the like—sometimes merged 
or cross-fertilized with other activities. At other 
times CSR is seen as embedded within core 
activities (e.g., within risk management), or 
considered the responsibility of management 
and the board. Th ere are several distinct, yet 
overlapping, communities of standardization 
practice (Star and Lampland 2009: 7) within 
Statkraft , and the transition from “doing” CSR 
(in line with IFC-PS) to “writing” CSR (accord-
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ing to GRI standards) is therefore blurry and 
involves translation work. 
In Statkraft  there are many diff erent reasons 
for a move toward standardizing CSR work, 
but there are likewise many causes for the par-
tial implementation of standards, be it fl exible 
adaptation to local expectations (recycling), 
in-house pragmatic mixing of CSR and other 
agendas (such as in the irrigation project), or 
a consideration of what resources are “reason-
able” to spend on aligning with international 
standards that are frequently upgraded. Hetero-
geneity of the CSR fi eld is probably also repro-
duced by people wanting to hold on to their jobs 
and who are defending and expanding their 
turf. All the translation work going on within 
the corporation, between diff erent standards 
and for reporting—much of it for internal pur-
poses only—is very costly in terms of eff ort; not 
all fi nd it meaningful. Reporting is demanding 
for Statkraft , not because it puts limitations on 
the way in which staff  manage their projects, 
but because of the translation work and internal 
mobilization necessary to produce stories, cate-
gories, and numbers that satisfy the externally 
defi ned standards and perceived needs for cor-
porate communication.
CSR work is not as standardized as it may 
appear from the outside and as many analysts 
seem to assume (Merry 2011).5 It is perhaps 
precisely the ability within Statkraft  to keep 
CSR in “suspense”—or rather keep in suspense 
the ambivalences and dissonances concern-
ing standardized CSR—that makes it useful 
and powerful. Standardization is thus partly a 
“make believe” standardization, and work re-
lated to CSR standards is characterized by fl ex-
ible pragmatism. It is precisely because people 
in corporations are pragmatic and fl exible that 
standards seem to be working, just as James 
Scott (1998) argued was the case for high mod-
ernist states’ standardizing schemes, and Susan 
Star and Martha Lampland (2009: 4) have ar-
gued is generally the case in people’s dealings 
with standards: “work must get done.” Corpo-
rations may be less rigid than high-modernist 
state bureaucracies. Pragmatic fl exibility is ac-
tually encouraged by persons in relevant senior 
or CSR positions in Statkraft  who, taking a re-
fl exive stance, do not fi nd it problematic that 
there are many ways of doing and talking about 
CSR within the organization: “Th ose working in 
the fi eld must themselves fi nd the concepts that 
are most natural for them to apply”; “CSR will 
always be framed by local politics and culture”; 
“Our use of ‘CSR’ is pragmatic—we are looking 
to getting things done.” Th e pragmatic approach 
is even articulated in the CR report: “Statkraft  
has a decentralized approach to stakeholder 
management” (Statkraft  2017b: 9). Th at the bor-
der between CSR and other activities becomes 
blurred is even considered appropriate—that 
means that CSR has become integrated with 
other concerns and agendas in the corporation. 
Especially when it comes to reporting, it may be 
more important for the corporation to “be seen 
to be making the world legible” (i.e., transpar-
ent) rather than actually doing so. 
Although Statkraft  employees may stress that 
they act as “ambassadors” of Norway in their 
foreign operations, and the ministry stresses 
that it expects Statkraft  to be responsible when 
operating in Turkey (see Figure 1), there is not 
much trace of the Nordic model in the way 
Statkraft  works in Turkey. Th e way they enact 
responsibility is informed by international stan-
dards, particularly those of the IFC and the GRI. 
Th us, the concept of “stakeholder,” for example, 
has come into Statkraft ’s vocabulary through 
interaction with international standards and 
experience from managing international proj-
ects. Statkraft  has never used the concept in its 
domestic activities. Th e “other” of Statkraft  in a 
domestic context has not been standardized as 
“stakeholder.” As a state agency in Norway, the 
work of Statkraft  had been embedded in regu-
lar political and bureaucratic procedures and 
a complex sociopolitical landscape consisting 
of citizens and households, users, municipal-
ities, other state agencies, unions, and various 
other organizations. Th ere its activities were 
“already” political and not easily framed as Stat-
kraft  versus stakeholders. But, operating away 
from home, Statkraft  has needed both CSR and 
Standardizing responsibility through the stakeholder fi gure | 73
stakeholders—little of which has been explic-
itly informed by the Nordic model. However, 
the Norwegian state has not requested Statkraft  
to be “Nordic” when working abroad. Th ey are 
tasked primarily with doing business. If one can 
argue that reference to universal norms for re-
sponsibility may be typical in the Nordic socie-
tal model, then one may perhaps also say that it 
is “Nordic” to expect corporations to be partic-
ularly responsible by requiring them to adhere 
to international standards and frameworks. 
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 1. In this text we will, for consistency, continue to 
use CSR as an overarching analytical term, even 
when Statkraft  employees would have preferred 
another term.
 2. According to a Statkraft  internal document, 
there is a loss of 4,271 dönüm/acre of land, of 
which more than 3,000 dönüm/acre are fi rst 
class agricultural land.
 3. For an elaboration and discussion about CSR in 
Turkey, see Knudsen (2015). 
 4. See GRI: Empowering Sustainable Decisions, 
https://www.globalreporting.org/standards (ac-
cessed 28 July 2020). 
 5. See Welker (2014) and Sydow (2016) for more 
nuanced studies of CSR and standards.
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